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COMMENTS
G  A? SADC D   G D
The debates surrounding both the content and interpretation of human rights
have always been contentious. It seems that the points of diﬀerence between
countries, including those on the African continent,1 are such that consensus on
the content of human rights is diﬃcult if not impossible to reach. Perhaps the
time has come to move away from “one size fits all” initiatives. Short of
abandoning human rights altogether, heresy in this day and age, perhaps we
should seek consensus amongst smaller groupings of states, hence the suggestion
made here that the countries of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) should go it alone. Indeed one could argue that the process of going it
alone has already begun. In gender issues that has been achieved in SADC by
way of two Declarations, the first the 1997 SADC Gender and Development
Declaration and the second the 1998 Addendum to the Declaration on Violence
Against Women. Before examining the provisions of the two declarations, it is
as well to give a brief background to SADC.
SADC comprises 14 countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It was formed
in Lusaka on 1 April 1980 and was originally known as the Southern African
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). At its formation there were
nine member states. In 1992 a meeting was held in Windhoek, Namibia which
led to the signing of the Declaration and Treaty which established the Southern
African Development Community. The objectives of the Community include
poverty alleviation, employment creation, the promotion of self-sustaining
development through self-reliance and interdependence of member states. The
SADC Treaty also provides that the community seeks to “evolve common
political values, systems and institutions” and “to strengthen and consolidate the
long-standing historical, social and cultural aﬃnities and links among people of
the region”.2
Given the diversity of countries within the SADC grouping, this is indeed a
tall order. The countries range from the very small, in terms of population, like
Namibia, to the very large like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC);
from economically strong countries like Botswana and South Africa to some of
the poorest countries in the world such as Mozambique, Malawi and increasingly
Zimbabwe; from post-socialist states like Tanzania to aggressively capitalist states
like South Africa; and from conflict-ridden Angola and the DRC, to peaceful
Mauritius and Seychelles. However, although many things divide the states,
there is much that unites them, not least the position of women. In all SADC
countries women are, relative to men, disadvantaged, socially, economically,
1 See the debates around the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Human Rights of Women, Addis Ababa, 13 September 2001, CAB/LEG/66.6.
2 As quoted in SADC Gender Monitor (1999) at 44.
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culturally, politically and legally. This despite the fact that article 6(2) of the
SADC Treaty prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
SADC countries have shown a formal commitment to gender equality in that
all of them except Swaziland have ratified the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).3 Indeed the SADC
bloc was influential in getting the Optional Protocol to CEDAW4 adopted.
During Namibia’s presidency of the Security Council it helped to push through
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security.5 All
SADC countries have ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights 19816 together with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
19897 and many have ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child, 1990.8 Still there appears to be a gap between promise and practice.
Reasons for this are many. Ongoing civil wars in Angola and the DRC mean
that all but the elite are subject to poverty and deprivation. The AIDS pandemic
is having a monumental impact on the economies and populations of the entire
region. Where women’s rights are concerned, there is of course the barrier of
the broadly defined “culture” which is often put forward as the reason for their
inferiority of treatment. This leads us to the SADC Declaration on Gender and
Development of 1997 and the Addendum to the Declaration on Violence Against
Women of 1998.
The Declarations have their roots in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action.9 Returning from the Beijing Conference, women from the SADC region,
from both the governmental and non-governmental sectors, determined to make
real the 12 points of action identified in Beijing. To this end, the task force that
had been set up by women from the government and NGO sector to prepare
for Beijing, was transformed into a Regional Advisory Committee after the
conference.10 Working with this Committee, the SADC Council of Ministers
“adopted a policy and institutional framework for gender mainstreaming”.11
Seven months later in September 1997 the SADC group adopted the SADC
Gender and Development Declaration.
This Declaration is a synthesis of the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies,12
CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. It provides that
gender equality is a fundamental right13 and that SADC member states by virtue
of the non-discrimination provision in the founding treaty of SADC,14 undertake
not to discriminate, inter alia, on the basis of gender. The preamble to the
3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December
1979, 1249 UNTS 13.
4 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women reproduced in P. Ghandi (ed.), Blackstone’s International Human Rights Documents, 2nd ed.,
London, 2000, 103.
5 SC Res. 1325, 2000.
6 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 reproduced in 21 ILM (1982) 59.
7 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, GA Res. 44/25.
8 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted July 1990, OAU Doc.CAB/
LEG/TSG.Rev.1.
9 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 15 September 1995 reproduced in 35 ILM 404
(1996).
10 SADC Gender Monitor (1999) at 1.
11 Ibid.
12 Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000, UN Doc. A/
CONF.116/12, 1985.
13 SADC Gender and Development Declaration 1997, Bi.
14 SADC Treaty article 6(2).
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Declaration also notes that in SADC countries: “Gender is an area in which
considerable agreement already exists and where there are substantial benefits
to be gained from closer regional co-operation and collective action”. To this
end the Declaration makes provision for mainstreaming gender concerns within
the work of SADC.15 SADC countries then pledge to focus on women’s interests
in the socio-economic, cultural and civil and political fields. This remit includes
achieving a 30 per cent target of women in political and decision-making
structures by the year 2005.16 South Africa is the only country that has so far
met this target. There has however been increasing recognition of the need for
aﬃrmative action policies to redress the imbalance which have been introduced
in Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The measures,
however, “will only be eﬀective if they are enforced and women are provided
with the skills to hold public oﬃce”.17 The SADC governments also undertake
to promote women’s access to productive resources such as land18 and formal
employment as a way of reducing poverty19 and to enhance women’s access to
education and health facilities.20 The issue of land ownership is an important
and contentious one. While countries pledge to give women access to land in
their own right, few deliver.21 Those meeting their obligations include Tanzania
which has passed a Land Act giving women the right to own land.22 However,
there are sometimes conflicts between statutory provision and customary practice
so that in Lesotho for example: “The Land Act of 1979 . . . is gender-neutral in
its provisions. The practice of allocating land to married men, especially in the
rural areas, is based on customary attitudes and practices.”23 The gains made
by women at the population conference held in Cairo in 199424 are reflected in
the list of State obligations to recognize, protect and promote not only the
reproductive rights of women and girls, but also their sexual rights.25 This is an
important pledge particularly for women in countries like Mauritius which has
a high rate of back-street abortions because of the illegality of abortion in the
country.26
Picking up on article 18(2) of the African Charter, the SADC Gender and
Development Declaration enjoins states to promote the human rights of women
and children. In order to facilitate this, the “mass media is to disseminate
15 SADC Gender and Development Declaration, 1997, Fii.
16 Ibid., H(ii).
17 SADC Gender Monitor (1999) 13.
18 Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust (WLSA) (2001) A Critical Analysis of Women’s
Access to Land in the WLSA Countries. See also A. Ngwala, “The new Land Acts in Tanzania and
women’s access to land rights”, in J. Stewart and S. Mvududu (eds.), WLSA Colloquium Papers,
forthcoming.
19 SADC Gender and Development Declaration 1997, H(iii).
20 Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre, Beyond Inequalities: Women in Southern
Africa, 2000, 213–257.
21 Cf. F. Butegwa, “Using the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to secure women’s
access to land in Africa, in R. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives,
1994, 495.
22 Tanzania Land Act 1998.
23 Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) and Women and Law in
Southern Africa Research Trust (WLSA) Beyond Inequalities: Women in Lesotho, 1997, 15.
24 International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, UN Doc. A/CONF. 171/
13, 18 October 1994.
25 SADC Gender and Development Declaration 1997, H(viii).
26 Southern African Research and Documentation Centre Beyond Inequalities: Women in Mauritius,
1997, 50.
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information and materials on the human rights of women and children”.27
Acknowledging the importance of law in social change and the impact of custom
in resisting that change, the Declaration borrows from CEDAW by providing
that States undertake to engage in “repealing and reforming all laws, amending
constitutions and changing social practices which will still subject women to
discrimination, and enacting empowering gender-sensitive laws”.28
This is particularly important because most of the SADC countries have
plural legal systems, aspects of which discriminate against women. Indeed some
countries’ constitutions are in contravention of the SADC Declaration so that
the Zimbabwean Constitution continues to ring-fence customary personal law
from the non-discrimination provisions in the Constitution thus allowing the
continuation of discrimination against women “in matters of adoption, marriage,
divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal
law”.29
Although the Declaration does touch on the issue of violence against women,
providing that states should deal urgently with the increased levels of violence
against women,30 it was felt that the issue merited particular attention and
consequently the SADC Gender Unit drafted an Addendum to the 1997
Declaration focusing on the issue of violence against women.31 Using the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action32 as the starting point,33 the SADC
document identifies violence as including physical, emotional, economic, sexual
and psychological violence.34 Drawing its inspiration from CEDAW general
recommendation number 1935 and the UN General Assembly Declaration on
the Elimination of all Forms of Violence Against Women, 1993,36 the SADC
document identifies the locus of violence as being the home, the community and
at the hands of the state.37 Specific forms of violence identified include economic
deprivation, sexual abuse of children, marital rape, traﬃcking and forced
prostitution and female genital mutilation.38 The Declaration notes that the
existing measures have proved inadequate in dealing with the issue and indeed
in some instances they have been biased against the victims.39 To address these
shortcomings, the Declaration suggests that measures to be taken to eradicate
violence against women and children be grouped under five broad categories:
(i) legal measures,40 (ii) social, economic, cultural and political measures,41
(iii) services which will include providing information on services available to
27 SADC Gender and Development Declaration 1997, H(x).
28 Ibid., H(iv), cf. CEDAW articles 2(f ), 5.
29 Constitution of Zimbabwe 1979, as amended, s. 23(3).
30 SADC Gender and Development Declaration 1997, H(ix).
31 The Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children: An Addeddum to
the 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development by SADC Heads of State or Government, 1998
(hereinafter SADC Violence Declaration 1998).
32 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action reproduced in 32 ILM 1661 (1993).
33 SADC Violence Declaration 1998, article 4.
34 Ibid., article 5.
35 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women. UN Doc. A/47/
38, 30 January 1992.
36 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GA Res. 48/104, 20 December
1993.
37 SADC Violence Declaration 1998, article 5(a)(b)(c).
38 Ibid., article 5(a)(b).
39 Ibid., article 7.
40 Ibid., articles 8–12.
41 Ibid., articles 13–15.
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victims of violence,42 (iv) measures including education, training and awareness
building,43 and (v) the requirement that States make adequate provision for these
services in their budgets.44 Again the SADC approach reflects the integrated
approach45 of the UN General Assembly Declaration. The legal measures to be
taken include enacting laws that make clear that violence against women is a
crime and ensuring the eﬀective enforcement of legislation. The importance of
communal dialogue and education to tackle cultural justifications for violence
and stereotypes46 of the victims of violence is noted.47
Recognizing the relatively weak economic position of women and children
which increases their vulnerability, the Declaration enjoins States to provide
“easily accessible, aﬀordable, and, where possible, free social, and administrative
services for the empowerment of women and children victims/survivors of
domestic violence”.48 Ultimately it is acknowledged that the responsibility rests
with the State to “adopt(ing) such other legislative and administrative measures
as may be necessary to ensure the prevention and eradication of all forms of
violence against women and children”.49
Recent studies of violence against women in the region would seem to show
that whilst some states have changed their laws,50 the problem remains a major
stumbling block to the full enjoyment by women of their human rights.51 The
issue of violence is compounded by poverty, lack of education and access to
health facilities which is particularly problematic in light of the HIV epidemic
currently engulfing the region. In this regard, it is significant that when asked
to identify their national priority areas of concern,52 12 SADC countries identified
education and training as being the most pressing followed by health (9) with
poverty, violence and issues around power and decision-making tied in third
place, which when taken together all go to show the inter-connectedness of issues
of lack of access to resources and decision-making structures with a high incidence
of violence against women.
It remains to consider why SADC and its Declarations are important and
what they can tell us about possible future developments in human rights. The
first point that needs to be addressed is how important are declarations which
are, after all, soft law. Article 18(3) of the African Charter 1980 does not
discriminate between declarations and conventions thus suggesting that they are
to be considered equally binding: “The State shall ensure the elimination of
every discrimination against women and children and shall ensure the protection
of the rights of the women and the child as stipulated in international declarations
and conventions.” The Dow case53 shows that that provision can be used to good
42 Ibid., articles 16–19.
43 Ibid., articles 20–22.
44 Ibid., article 24.
45 Ibid., article 23. Cf UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Violence Against Women, 1993, articles 4, 5, 6.
46 Ibid., article 15.
47 Ibid., article 13.
48 Ibid., article 19.
49 Ibid., article 12.
50 Mauritius, Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 1997, Tanzania, Sexual Oﬀences Provisions
Act, 1997, Zimbabwe, Sexual Oﬀences Act, 2001.
51 See in particular WLSA Botswana, Chasing the Mirage: Women and the Administration of Justice,
1999, WLSA Malawi, In Search of Justice: Women and the Administration of Justice in Malawi, 2000.
52 SADC Gender Monitor (1999) at 8.
53 Unity Dow v. Attorney General [1991] LRC (Const) 574.
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eﬀect. It is important to acknowledge that the existence of a raft of international
instruments has not always guaranteed the enjoyment of human rights in general
and women’s rights in particular. In this regard, Manji has questioned the
reliance on law to deliver justice to African women: “Women have experienced
state law as coercive and have deliberately distanced themselves from its control,
a fact that undercuts the claim of state law to intervene in every aspect of social
life.”54
However for all its constraints, law is a powerful tool that can stimulate
change. There are grounds to be hopeful about the prospects of the SADC
Declarations bringing about change to the region. Largely this is because of a
strong NGO community that includes the powerful Women and Law in Southern
Africa Research Trust with oﬃces in seven SADC countries. The NGO lobby
is influential in the region with NGOs undertaking research, briefing governments,
helping to draft legislation, helping with dissemination eﬀorts and taking test
cases to court. Rightly or wrongly women’s rights are not considered to be as
controversial as multiple-party politics, and so by and large governments are
happy to advance, formally, the cause of gender equality.55 It is also self-evident
that it is easier to get consensus and to iron out diﬀerences when there are a
few parties participating than when there are many.
F B
School of Oriental and African Studies
A   I:
W   P U B L?
Section 149(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act1 gives the court
a discretion to allow amendments to be made in the indictment or summons at
any time before judgment if it considers that such amendment will not prejudice
the accused in his or her defence. It provides:
“Whenever, on the trial of any indictment or summons, there appears to be any
variance between the statement therein and evidence oﬀered in proof of such
statement, or if it appears that any words or particulars that ought to have been
inserted in the indictment or summons have been omitted, or that there is any
other error in the indictment or summons the court may at any time before
judgment, if it considers that the making of the necessary amendment in the
indictment or summons will not prejudice the accused in his defence, order that
the indictment or summons be amended, so far as it is necessary, by some oﬃcer
of the court or other person, both in that part thereof where the variance, omission,
insertion, or error occurs, and in every other part thereof which it may become
necessary to amend.”
The general rule is that an amendment of a summons should be done before
the accused pleads and not during the reading of judgment or delivery thereof.2
54 A. Manji, “Imagining women’s ‘legal world’: towards a feminist theory of legal pluralism in
Africa”, (1999) 8(4) Social and Legal Studies 435 at 451.
55 This is not in any way to suggest that women’s rights advocates do not experience harassment.
Some do. See for example, World Organization Against Torture “Violence against women in
Zambia: a report to the Committee against torture”, 2002, 247–248.
1 Cap. 08:02 1987 Rev.
2 Hlupekile v. The State (1982) 1 BLR 134.
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However, in terms of this section, an amendment may be applied for and granted
at any time before judgment.
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of section 149(1) the extent of
the power to amend conferred by this section has been the subject of conflicting
decisions in the High Court of Botswana. The controversy has centred on what
constitutes an “amendment” within the subsection. This short comment seeks
to analyse the judicial views expressed on the subsection and to ascertain which
one is appropriate in the absence of a definitive opinion of the Court of Appeal.
Judicial interpretation of the subsection
Two views have emerged from the case law. Some judges have been of the
opinion that the word “amend” can and does include substituting an existing
charge with a new one, while others take the view that where an amendment
has the eﬀect of substituting a new charge then it is invalid for it goes beyond
the meaning of the word “amend”.
An exponent of the second view is Justice Corduﬀ who expressed the view in
State v. Lephole3 that the section only provides for certain amendments to the
particulars to bring the charge into line with evidence. He expressed himself
thus:
“Nowhere in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act is a court empowered to
substitute an entirely new charge for the one to which an accused has pleaded.
Section 1484 provides only for certain amendments to the particulars to bring the
charge into line with the evidence subject to certain safeguards.”5
This dictum was made in an appeal where the accused was originally charged
with rape but during trial the evidence pointed, or so the presiding magistrate
believed, to indecent assault. By section 191 of the then Criminal Procedure
and Evidence Act6 the court is empowered to find an accused guilty of a lesser
oﬀence when charged with rape. The trial magistrate invoked provisions of this
section and ordered substitution of the charge of rape by one of indecent assault.
The review quashed the conviction, ruling that: “the substitution of a charge of
indecent assault was in the present case a grave irregularity”. Again in State v.
Thekiso,7 relying on Zimbabwean case of State v. Moyo,8 C, J., observed
that:
“The nature and extent of amendments which are permissible in terms of section
148 are limited and while what can be done in any case will depend upon the
particular situation obtaining in that case the general rule is that there must not
be a new charge substituted for the one to which the accused pleaded.”9
In State v. Moyo the accused was charged with and pleaded guilty to stock theft.
The prosecutor accepted the plea and tendered to the magistrate a statement of
agreed facts. This was read to the accused who, in reply, claimed that he had
been compelled by terrorists on pain of death to steal the cattle. The magistrate
altered the plea to not guilty. Thereupon the prosecutor advised that he intended
3 1979 BLR 215.
4 Now s. 149(1) 1987 Rev.
5 At 217.
6 Cap. 08:02 1973 Rev. (now s. 192 1987 Rev.).
7 1981 BLR 267.
8 1979(1) SA 1024.
9 Above at 275.
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to charge the accused with 14 counts of theft of stock in substitution for the
charge before the court. Later the accused appeared before another magistrate,
who was aware that a plea of not guilty had been entered. In spite of such
knowledge he permitted the prosecutor to put to the accused an entirely new
charge which alleged the commission of 14 counts of theft of stock. He was
asked to plead, and reiterated that he had stolen the cattle under compulsion.
Pleas of not guilty were entered but he was convicted on all counts. On review
of the case the issue was whether it was an “amendment” to substitute a charge
to which an accused had pleaded with an entirely new one. G, J., observed
that an amendment contemplated by section 19110 “must be an amendment to the
charge not the substitution of an entirely new charge” (emphasis mine). The conviction
and sentence were overturned.
Similarly in the South African case of R v. Muyekwa11 L, J., held that the
substitution of one oﬀence for another was not an amendment. In this case the
accused had pleaded guilty to a charge of common assault. During the Crown
case and in view of the evidence led by the Crown, the prosecutor applied for
an amendment to a charge of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
The magistrate allowed the amendment and the accused was convicted on the
new charge. L, J., held that the so-called “amendment” of the charge was
not an amendment within the meaning of the Act12 but that “it was the substitution
of an entirely new charge which was not competent”. The interpretation of
section 149 preferred by C, J., was also adopted and followed by
B J, J., in Monyamane v. The State13 where he quashed the conviction
and set aside the decision of the trial court on the basis that, “the procedure
adopted by the learned magistrate resulted in a serious irregularity”.14 In that
case the trial court had allowed the changing of a charge of indecent assault to
that of rape. In his Lordship’s view, if during trial the prosecution realizes that
the indictment or charge sheet does not cover all the criminal conduct of the
accused and wishes to add more charges against the accused, the proper course
to be followed is for the prosecutor to seek leave to withdraw the case in terms
of the proviso to the then section 14915 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence
Act, and to lay a fresh charge against the accused.
The contrary view was expressed by H, J., in State v. Kgano.16 He
considered that while it is true that for there to be an amendment there must
be some existing thing which is the subject of correcting, it does not mean that
the substitution of a new charge for the original necessarily falls outside the
scope of the word “amend”.17 Justice Hannal considered the Zimbabwean High
Court decisions in the cases of State v. Moyo18 and State v. Collet,19 in which appeals
were allowed against an amendment which changed a charge of common assault
to one of assault with intent to do grievous harm. He particularly noted the
statement by the court in the latter case to the eﬀect that: “not every alteration,
10 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act Chap. 59.
11 1947 (4) SA 433.
12 S. 225 of Act 31 of 1917.
13 1985 BLR 230.
14 At p. 235.
15 Now s. 150.
16 1981 BLR 186.
17 At 191.
18 Above n. 8.
19 1978 (4) SA 324.
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particularly one that causes the complete destruction of the ‘existing thing’ or
its substitution by something else, can properly be deemed an amendment”.20
His Lordship then considered the English authorities which deal with the court’s
jurisdiction to amend an indictment. The power is contained in section 5(1) of
the Indictment Act of 1915 which reads:
“Where before trial or at any stage of a trial, it appears to the court that the
indictment is defective, the court shall make such order for the amendment of the
indictment as the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case,
unless having regard to the merits of the case, the required amendments cannot
be made without injustice, and may make such order as to the payment of any
costs incurred owing to the necessity for amendment as the court thinks fit.”
In the English case of R v. Johal and Lam21 the court held that: “in the judgment
of this court, there is no rule of law which precludes amendment of an indictment
after arraignment either by addition of a new count or otherwise”. Similarly, in
R v. Radley22 three additional counts of conspiracy were added by way of
amendment at the end of the prosecution case.
Having considered both the Zimbabwean and South African authorities on
the one hand and English authorities on the other, H, J., observed by
way of obiter that the interpretation of section 149(1) by the courts in Botswana
was to state the position rather too widely.23 In this case H, J., did not
conclusively state the position of the law, the case being decided on other
grounds. However in Amogelang v. The State24 H, J., confronted the issue
head-on. After a comprehensive examination of both Zimbabwean and South
African authorities, he came to the conclusion that the power of amendment
conferred by section 149(1) includes the power to substitute charges.
The question that arises is why this divergence of opinion in the first place?
A closer look at the cases suggests that this has arisen because one view relied
on similar provisions in section 5(1) of the English Indictment Act of 1915 and
the other on the South African and Zimbabwean equivalents to section 149(1).
In his review of the authorities in Amogelang v. The State, H, J., was fortified
in his view by saying:
“I am influenced in reaching this conclusion firstly by the similarity between section
149(1) of our Act and section 5(1) of the English Indictment Act, 1915. . . . Although
section 5(1) speaks in general terms of a defective indictment whereas section 149(1)
particularises a number of instances when an amendment may be made the section
then deals with the matter in a general way stating ‘or that there is any other error
in the indictment or summons’.”
He concluded,
“To my mind, in this context, error or defect are of similar meaning and eﬀect
and the circumstances in which an amendment may be made are as wide under
section 149(1) as they are under its English counterpart. I respectfully disagree
with the narrow interpretation placed upon the section by C, J., in State v.
Lephole.”25
20 At 191.
21 (1972) 56 Cr. Appeal R. 348.
22 1974 58 Cr. Appeal R. 394.
23 At 191.
24 1984 BLR 201.
25 At 217.
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His Lordship expressed the view that there was a fundamental diﬀerence between
section 149(1) and its South African and Zimbabwean counterparts. In the South
African equivalent the power to amend is in relation to a charge and the
Zimbabwean equivalent also refers to a charge whilst under section 149(1) it is
in relation to an indictment or a summons. A “charge” consists of statement of
oﬀence and particulars thereof while “indictment” refers to the whole document.
In his view this diﬀerence is a vital one because while the addition of a new
charge to an original charge could be said to be filling a gap with something
that should already have been there and thus goes beyond the meaning of the
word “amend” in the sense of the perfecting or ameliorating of an existing thing,
the addition of a new charge does not have the same eﬀect. The indictment or
summons has been in existence from the outset of the trial and the addition of
a new count cannot be said to be merely the perfecting or correcting the
indictment. The destruction of the count by the substitution of another does not
destroy the indictment. The concept of indictment is far wider than that of a
charge. Using this logical reasoning H, J., arrived at the conclusion that
the interpretation to be placed on section 149(1) is that which is placed on its
English equivalent.
Once H, J.’s reasoning is appreciated it becomes clear therefore that
the South African and Zimbabwean authorities were not immediately relevant
for they interpret the word “amend” in the context of a charge and not an
indictment.
Which way forward for the Court of Appeal?
It is likely that we will continue to see conflicting decisions over the in-
terpretation of section 149(1) and the loser is the criminal justice system and
indeed the accused who are faced with the prospect of like cases being treated
diﬀerently. The situation calls for intervention by the Court of Appeal.
It is trite law that where the trial court has discretionary power the Court of
Appeal is not entitled to substitute its discretion for that of the trial court.26 It
can only interfere in cases where the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction or
imposed a sentence (in matters relating sentencing), which was not legally
permissible for a crime, or has been influenced by facts or motives which were
not appropriate for consideration. The question under consideration does not
involve the discretionary powers of such courts. What is at issue is whether the
word “amend” as used in section 149(1) should be given a narrower or broader
meaning, that is, should the word be interpreted to mean not only the perfecting
of a charge but also the substitution or addition of new charges? The arguments
of H, J., are to a large extent very attractive taking into account the fact
that criminal procedure law in Botswana is fashioned largely after the English
law, hence the similarity in the provisions of the local Act and its English
equivalent. However, a constitutional argument can be raised to support a
narrower interpretation.
The Constitution of Botswana requires that a person charged with a criminal
oﬀence must be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a language that
26 Ntsompe Shoto and others v. R 1960 HCTLR 1. See also Motsekae Motjolobeka v. R 1955 HCTLR
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he or she understands and in detail, of the nature of the oﬀence charged.27 It
further requires that the accused be given adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his or her defence. One might therefore ask whether the con-
stitutional requirement is complied with where a person charged with assault
and brought to court to answer that charge is instead required to answer to a
charge of rape. Similarly, would it be in compliance with the Constitution for a
prosecutor during the trial to apply for leave to amend and substitute the oﬀence
of assault for rape?
It is submitted that an interpretation which gives a narrower meaning to the
word “amend” is more in consonance with the Constitution in that it does not
permit surprises for the accused at the trial. Thus the better approach is the one
advanced by B J, J., i.e. that if during the trial the prosecution
realizes that the indictment or charge sheet does not cover all the criminal
conduct of the accused and wishes to add more charges then the prosecutor
must seek leave to withdraw the case and then lay fresh charges against the
accused.
K.K. L
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27 S. 10(1).
